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POWER OF ATTORNEY- POWER TO ABUSE? 
THE NEED FOR REFORM 
by 
Elizabeth A Marcuccio* 
John W. Arpey** 
Krystle G. Chalich*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New York State's durable power of attorney is a 
commonly used legal device. It allows an individual, the 
"principal", to designate an "agent", also known as an 
"attorney-in-fact", to act on the principal 's behalf. The 
General Obligations Law (GOL) sets forth the statutory short 
fonn power of attorney .1 This fonn enumerates various 
broadly defined specific categories of authority that can be 
given to an agent. At the time of execution each broadly 
defined category that the principal intends to vest authority in 
the agent must be initialed by the principal. The power of 
attorney form is simple to execute and use, but these very 
features are what render it susceptible to abuse.2 
II. AGENT'S DUTY TO PRINCIPAL 
New York's power of attorney statute does not 
specifically state that the agent owes a fiduciary duty to the 
principal.3 At first glance, this does not appear to be a problem. 
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Logic dictates that the attorney-in-fact is a fiduciary, and is 
accountable to the principal under the general rules of agencJ 
law. In fact, numerous courts have reached this conclusion. 
However only the gift-giving powers contained in GOL §5-
150 1 ( 1) (M) unambiguously impose a duty on the agent to 
exercise authority in the best interest of the principal. 
GOL §5-1501 (1) (M) authorizes an agent to make gifts 
to the principal's "spouse, children and more remote 
descendants, and parents, not to exceed in the aggregate 
$10,000.00 to each of such persons in any year." GOL §5-
1502M construes this gift-giving authority to mean that the 
principal authorizes the agent to make gifts "only for purposes 
which the agent reasonably deems to be in the best interest of 
the principal, specifically including minimization of income, 
estate, inheritance, generation-skipping transfer or gift taxes."5 
The statutory short fonn power of attorney may contain 
additional language, pursuant to GOL §5-1503, authorizing 
gifts in excess of $10,000.00 or gifts to other beneficiaries.6 
GOL §5-1503 does not include a "best interest" standard. Is 
the agent required to act in the principal's best interest when 
the agent's gift-giving authority is augmented by GOL §5-
1503? This is the issue that the New York State Court of 
Appeals addressed In the Matter of Ferrara.7 
In Ferrara the decedent, George Ferrara, a Florida 
resident, executed a will on June 10, 1999, leaving his entire 
estate to the Salvation Army. His will specifically made "no 
provision . .. for any family member. . . or any individual person" 
because it was his "intention to leave (his) entire residuary 
estate to charity."8 Decedent was single and had no children. 
His closest relatives were his brother, John, a sister, and their 
respective children. On August 16, 1999, decedent executed a 
codicil naming his attorney as his executor, and "ratif(ied), 
confinn(ed) and republish(ed) (his) said Will of June 10, 
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1999."9 Decedent was hospitalized in December 1999, and his 
brother's son, Dominick Ferrara, traveled from New York to 
Florida to visit him. 10 
According to Dominick Ferrara the decedent "told 
(him) he wanted to move to New York to be near his family." 11 
On January 15, 2000, Dominick accompanied the decedent on 
a flight from Florida to New York, where decedent was 
immediately admitted to an assisted living facility. Ten days 
later, on January 25, decedent signed, and initialed where 
required, multiple originals of a New York statutory short form 
durable power of attorney. Decedent appointed John and 
Dominick Ferrara as his attorneys-in-fact, and allowed either of 
them to act separately.12 Decedent not only authorized his 
agents to make gifts in accordance with GOL §5-1501(1)(M), 
but also initialed a typewritten addition to the form, stating that 
"this Power of Attorney shall enable the Attorneys in Fact to 
make gifts without limitation in amount to John Ferrara and/or 
Dominick Ferrara."13 
Decedent was admitted to the hospital on January 29, 
2000, and died on February 12, 2000, less than a month after 
moving to New York, and approximately three weeks after 
executing the durable power of attorney. During those three 
weeks, Dominick Ferrara transferred all of the decedent's 
assets, valued at approximately $820,000.00, to himself. 14 The 
Salvation Army subsequently commenced a discovery 
proceeding in the Surrogate's Court against Dominick Ferrara 
and others, requesting turnover of the decedent's assets. 15 
The Surrogate dismissed the petition, noting that while 
the law requires an agent to demonstrate that gifts of 
$10,000.00 or less to specified individuals were made in the 
principal's best interest, no such requirement exists for gifts in 
excess of $10,000.00 or for gifts made to other individuals. 
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The Court invited the Legislature to amend the law "to provide 
for the same (best interest) limitation when there is express 
language in the power of attorney for gifts to an agent in excess 
of $10,000.00 per year." 16 The Appellate Division affirmed, 
and the Court of Appeals granted the Salvation Army 
permission to appeal. 17 
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the 
Appellate Division, and found that in all cases the attorney-in-
fact must act in the principal's best interest when making gifts. 
This is true regardless of whether the gift-giving power is 
limited to the authority spelled out in GOL §5-1501 (1) (M), or 
whether it is augmented by additional language pursuant to 
GOL §5-1503. 18 Nothing in GOL §5-1502M indicates that the 
best interest requirement is waived when additional language 
increases the gift amount or expands the individuals to whom 
gifts can be made. The Legislature intended GOL §5-1503 to 
function as a means to customize the statutory short form 
power of attorney, not as an escape hatch from the statute's 
protections. 19 That so much effort was required to deliver such 
a common-sense verdict testifies to the potential for abuse of 
New York principals by their attorneys-in-fact.20 
III. SELF DEALING 
A separate issue addressed by the Surrogate's Court in 
Ferrara is whether a "presumption of impropriety" exists when 
an attorney-in-fact makes gifts to himself. The Surrogate noted 
that at one time there was "a presumption of impropriety due to 
the appearance of impropriety and self-dealing" when an 
attorney-in-fact made self-gifts.21 The Surrogate held, 
however, that amendments to the General Obligations Law, 
enacted in 1996 and effective January 1, 1997, eliminated this 
presumption. "When a post-January 1, 1997 power of attorney 
specifically and expressly authorizes gifting by the agent to 
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himself, the presumption of impropriety no longer applies and 
the burden of proving the validity of the gift is no longer on the 
agent." Instead, the opposing party has the burden of proving 
the invalidity of the gift.22 
Even though the Appellate Division affirmed the 
Surrogate Court's decision in the Ferrara case, it reached a 
different conclusion on this issue. 
The Appellate Division clearly held that the 
presumption of impropriety still exists when an agent is 
involved in self-dealing. This presumption, however, can be 
rebutted and overcome. An agent can rebut the presumption by 
submitting evidence of a valid power of attorney in which the 
principal gives the agent express written authority to make gifts 
to himself.23 Courts also allow extrinsic evidence to establish 
the donative intent of the principal to rebut the presumption.24 
The Court of Appeals did not disturb this ruling of the 
Appellate Division when reaching its determination in Ferrara. 
IV. AGENT'S AUTHORITY SUBSEQUENT TO 
DISABILITY 
Scrutiny of the agent's actions often intensifies 
following a disability that renders the principal incompetent to 
act on his own. Assuming that the durable statutory form 
provided for in GOL §5-150 1 has been used, the agent has 
continuing authority to act. The agent is only relieved of that 
authority by an appointed committee or guardian under GOL 
§5-1505(2), or by death of the principal. The courts have had 
to reconcile the provisions of Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) 
article 81, which addresses the appointment of a guardian for 
an incapacitated person, with the principal's wishes and 
statutory right to have his appointed agent continue to act in his 
behalf following disability. The Appellate Division has ruled 
51Noi.19/North East Journal of Legal Studies 
on these issues in the In re Nellie G. 25 and in the Matter of 
Daniel IT. 26 
In the Nellie G., the principal executed a 
durable power of attorney in favor of her daughter. 7 This 
power of attorney became effective when the principal became 
disabled and further provided that the designation of her 
daughter as attorney-in-fact would not become ineffective upon 
the principal's subsequent incapacity. When Nellie G. suffered 
a series of stokes, and became uncommunicative as a result, 
she was ultimately admitted to a nursing home.28 The hospital 
commenced a proceeding under article 81 of the MHL to have 
an independent guardian appointed. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Supreme Court ruled that Nellie G. was 
incapacitated? 9 They also determined that her daughter had 
misused the power of attorney and that there were no available 
resources, such as powers of attorney, health care proxies and 
trusts, to act as alternatives to guardianship? 0 The court 
appointed an independent guardian and revoked the power of 
attorney given by Nellie G. to her daughter.31 
Upon appeal the Appellate Division disagreed. The 
Supreme Court was concerned about the daughter's fitness to 
manage Nellie G's property due to certain real estate 
transactions she had entered into on her mother's behalf. The 
Appellate Division stated that these real estate transfers made 
by the daughter did not financially benefit her as agent, and as 
a result did not harm Nellie G.'s interests in any way.32 They 
further stated that the appointment of an independent guardian 
should only be done as a last resort. The daughter's right to act 
as attorney-in-fact for her mother was reinstated? 3 
In the Matter of Daniel TT 34, a case also dealing with 
an application under MHL article 81, the power-of-attorney's 
execution was challenged by the daughter of the principal. The 
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principal appointed his only other child, Diane, as his attorney-
in-fact. It was specifically alleged that Diane exerted coercion 
upon her father, that he was under duress, and that he had 
diminished capacity due to Alzheimer's disease at the time he 
executed the power of attorney in question. 35 The father 
resided with Diane for some time prior to appointing her as his 
attorney-in-fact. At the time of the execution of the power of 
attorney he also established a trust, modified his will, and 
executed a health care proxy all in favor of Diane. The trust 
established an unequal distribution between the two siblings 
and utilized a different estate planning attorney than the 
attorney used by the principal over the past 30 years.36 It was 
further alleged that Diane was violating her fiduciary duties 
post appointment and was not taking proper care of her father. 
At the hearing the appointed court evaluator indicated he had 
spoken to the principal, and that the principal was opposed to 
the petition; he wanted Diane to continue as his attorney-in-
fact.37 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for 
appointment of a guardian, notwithstanding the request by the 
court evaluator for authorization to inspect the medical records 
of the principal under MHL §81.09 and request for retention of 
an expert to evaluate the principal's alleged diminished 
capacity. 
Upon appeal the Appellate Division reversed and 
remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further 
proceedings. 39 It was determined that MHL article 81 requires 
a two pronged analysis. First, it must be determined whether 
the appointment of a guardian is necessary to provide for the 
personal needs of the incapacitated person, including food, 
clothing, shelter, health care or safety, or management of 
financial affairs. Second, it must be determined whether the 
person agrees to the appointment, or in the alternative, is 
incapacitated.40 With regard to the first prong the court must 
consider the report of the court evaluator as well as the 
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sufficiency and reliability of the individual's "available 
resources". Here the principal's available resources consisted 
of the power of attorney, health care proxy and trust, all of 
whose validity were in question.41 
Upon review of the record the Appellate Division cited 
the affidavit of the principal's long term attorney and the 
affidavit of the court evaluator in creating a question of fact to 
overcome the presumptive validity of the principal's estate 
planning documents and raise a genuine question regarding the 
sufficiency and reliability of his available resources.42 Prior to 
rendering its decision the court cautioned that a guardian is to 
be appointed only as a last resort, and if done, must be in a 
manner which is least restrictive.43 It also noted that, when 
necessary, the court had previously utilized its authority to 
modify, amend, or revoke any previously executed estate 
planning documents by virtue of the provisions of MHL 
§81.29[d].44 
In re Nellie G. and in the Matter of Daniel IT. highlight 
the additional difficulties that can occur when challenges to the 
use of a durable power of attorney are scrutinized by the courts 
once the principal is incapacitated or has diminished capacity. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The New York State Law Revision Commission has 
made various proposals to modify the power of attorney 
statute. The Commission contends that the effectiveness of the 
power of attorney is often frustrated by the lack of sufficient 
statutory direction. Powers of attorney are broadly used in 
estate planning, and the absence of statutory guidance 
generates the potential for financial exploitation. A four year 
study conducted by the Commission found that the power of 
attorney is, without question, an effective tool for attorneys and 
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the public at large for estate planning and to avoid the expense 
of guardianship. This popularity, however, has led to its use 
for transactions far more complex than were originally 
contemplated by the law, particularly in the area of gift giving. 
The Law Revision Commission in 2006 proposed 
extensive modifications to the General Obligations Law as it 
relates to powers of attomey.45 The proposed changes are 
based upon input from various groups, including 
representatives from the Trusts and Estates and Elder Law 
sections of the New York State Bar and the banking 
community. The Commission believes that powers of attorney 
should remain flexible enough to allow agents to fulfill their 
principal's reasonable intentions, but expressed concern about 
the statute's silence and ambiguity regarding the agent's 
authority to transfer assets. The Commission has also 
recommended that the statute offer guidance to third parties 
asked to accept powers of attorney, as well as those asked to 
investigate financial exploitation. The objective of the 
Commission's proposal for modification is to provide clarity 
and direction and to deter and curb financial exploitation 
without unduly burdening the utility and simplicity of the 
power of attorney. 
Specifically, the Commission's 2006 proposal adds 
definitions and general requirements to the statute. To clarify 
the statute's ambiguity of language on fiduciary duty, the 
proposal states that "(a)n agent acting under a power of 
attorney has a fiduciary relationship with the principal".46 It 
also defines "best interest" to mean that an agent must act 
"solely for the principal's benefit".47 
The Commission expressed concern that the General 
Obligations Law does not require agents to keep records of 
financial transactions or to produce existing records if 
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investigated for impropriety. The proposed statutory form will 
allow the principal the option to appoint a "monitor". A 
monitor is defined as " ... a person appointed in the power of 
attorney who has the authority to request, receive, and compel 
the agent to provide a complete record of all receipts, 
disbursements, and transactions entered into by the agent on 
behalf of the principal. "48 
Perhaps the most significant proposed change is the 
addition of a "Statutory Major Gifts Rider". The purpose of 
this rider is similar to that of current GOL §5-1503: to 
augment the gift-giving authority of the agent. But that is 
where the similarity ends. The proposed statute clearly states 
that gifts authorized by the statutory major gifts rider may be 
made only for purposes which the agent reasonably deems to 
be in the best interests of the principal.49 It also states that the 
agent may not transfer the principal's property to himself 
without specific authorization in the major gifts rider.50 The 
rider must be signed at the end and dated by the principal in the 
presence of two witnesses who are not named as permissible 
recipients of gifts or other transfers. 
In order to implement the above changes, the proposed 
statutory form contains a "Notice to the Agent" that describes 
the agent's responsibilities. This notice states, in part: 
You have a duty (called a "fiduciary duty") to the 
principal. Your fiduciary duty requires you to: 
( 1) act solely in the best interest of the 
principal and avoid conflicts of interest between the principal 
and you or any other person; 
(2) keep the principal's property separate 
and distinct from any assets you own or control; 
2008/Power of Attorney-Power to Abuse?/56 
(3) keep a complete record of transactions 
entered into by you or your authorized delegate on the 
principal 's behalf and make the record available ...... 51 
The Notice to the Agent also states " ... you are not 
entitled to use the principal's assets to benefit yourself or to 
give gifts to yourself or anyone else unless this document 
specifically gives you that authority."52 Finally, the statutory 
form notifies the agent that if he violates his duty, he may be 
liable for damages and subject to criminal prosecution. 53 
These proposed modifications are currently in the hands 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee for further review. Several 
disagreements exist over the exact language, and concerns that 
the bill may initiate more frustrations due to its complexity are 
hindering the ratification of the bill. Some concern has been 
expressed that the proposed modifications encourage the use of 
a lawyer to prepare the power of attorney form. Some also 
argue that a specific provision should be added regarding 
advanced planning and Medicaid eligibility, although the Law 
Revision Commission believes that no specific provision is 
needed. 
As the population ages, the use of the power of attorney 
is likely to become more widespread. The Legislature has 
begun to recognize the problem of fmancial exploitation of 
elderly citizens. Amendment of the power of attorney statute 
will bring additional accountability into the monitoring system 
and help to lessen the potential for abuse. On the other hand, 
durable powers of attorney may lose their appeal if they 
become too complex in form and execution. The goal is to 
achieve a balance between the simplicity of the current power 
of attorney law and the need for adequate protection of the 
unaware or incompetent principal from an unscrupulous agent. 
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The vast majority of agents holding power of attorney 
discharge their duties honestly and competently. Yet problems 
can arise, even when agents act in what they believe to be the 
principal's best interest. The proposed changes to the General 
Obligations Law seek to clarify and simplify the present law, 
thereby ending the confusion that currently exists. 
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AN UNSETTLED QUESTION: THE EMERGENCE OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
TITLE VII 
by 
David S. Kistler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last few years, harassment based on gender 
identity (sometimes referred to as sexual orientation or sexual 
preference) has been accepted by some courts as a form of 
sexual discrimination. This is a new development in the law 
and clearly favors those in the transgender community who 
wish to describe themselves as members of the opposite sex. 
The basic issue presented in this paper is whether sexual 
orientation discrimination is included within the boundaries of 
sexual discrimination under Title VII. Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act states that it is illegal for any employer "to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of ... sex."1 
Serious problems exist since discrimination against 
transgendered individuals appears to be widespread. Mara 
Keisling, the executive director for the National Center for 
Transgender Equality in Washington, D.C. stated, " 'We get 
calls virtually every day from somebody who has been fired 
from his or her job' "2 for having a different sexual orientation 
*Assistant Professor of Accounting and Law at the State 
University of New York at Potsdam. 
